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I. INTRODUCTION
In Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications
Commission,' the Third Circuit reviewed the media cross-ownership limits
proposed by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC").2 The
Third Circuit critically examined the FCC's use of a "Diversity Index" to
reach its proposed rules3 and then remanded the Cross-Media Limits to the
FCC for justification or modification.4 Given this somewhat unusual
decision-a court not deferring to an administrative agency on a technical
rule-making issue-there has been surprisingly little reaction from the
academic community. 5
This Article begins with a discussion of Prometheus, ultimately
concluding that the FCC's Diversity Index scheme is fatally flawed
because it cannot simultaneously satisfy two assumptions shared by the
FCC and the Third Circuit: (1) diversity in a media market decreases with
ownership concentration; and (2) the contribution to diversity of an
individual entity-"diversity importance" 6-increases with the weighted
market shares of that entity's outlets. In Part II, this Article considers two
alternatives to the Diversity Index: one designed by Professor Eli Noam to
emphasize pluralism-the number of voices in media markets-and one
original index specifically designed to simultaneously satisfy the two
assumptions shared by the FCC and the Third Circuit. In Part III, this
Article tests these alternative indices by applying them to one of the FCC's
1. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005).
2. See id. at 402-12; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter Order].
3. See 373 F.3d at 403-12.
4. Id. at 403.
5. Compare Byron L. Dorgan, The FCC and Media Ownership: The Loss of the
Public Interest Standard, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 443, 452-54 (2005)
(criticizing the Diversity Index and commenting on the Third Circuit's remand of the Cross-
Media Limits in Prometheus), with John F. Sturm, Time for Change on Media Cross-
Ownership Regulation, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 205-06 (2004) (criticizing the Third
Circuit's decision to remand the Cross-Media Limits). See also Ellen P. Goodman, Media
Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital
Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1411-13 (2004).
6. See Order, supra note 2, para. 396 (discussing diversity importance).
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sample markets: Altoona, Pennsylvania. Part Iml concludes with the
observation that the index proposed in this Article not only satisfies the two
assumptions shared by the FCC and the Third Circuit, but also places
greater practical weight on pluralism than Professor Noam's index. Finally,
the Article concludes with the suggestion that adopting a suitable formulaic
measure of media diversity could be the first step in a broader review of
governmental regulation of media markets.
II. ANALYZING PROMETHEUS
In Prometheus, the Third Circuit found that the FCC employed
"several irrational assumptions and inconsistencies" when deriving the
Cross-Media Limits. 7 In particular, the court found that the FCC had
"inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index
results." 8 This Part begins with a review of how the FCC defined the
Diversity Index, applied it to various consolidation scenarios, and then used
the results to determine its Cross-Media Limits. Subpart B then reviews the
Third Circuit's analysis of these procedures and its grounds for holding that
the FCC had inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits. Finally,
Subpart C explains how the Third Circuit had in fact understated the
problem, showing that the Diversity Index is fatally flawed because it
cannot simultaneously satisfy all of the critical assumptions shared by the
FCC and the Third Circuit.
A. The FCC Procedure for Deriving Cross-Media Limits
This Subpart reviews the three-step procedure the FCC used to derive
its Cross-Media Limits. The first section describes the FCC's Diversity
Index and how the FCC applied the Diversity Index to media markets. The
second section explains how the FCC used the Diversity Index to evaluate
various hypothetical consolidation scenarios in media markets. The final
section then describes the Cross-Media Limits that the FCC derived from
its analysis of these consolidation scenarios.
1. The Diversity Index
The FCC designed the Diversity Index to identify "at risk" media
markets and based it on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ("HHI"), which
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use to
measure the concentration effects of proposed mergers in local markets. 9
An HI score is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of
7. 373 F.3d at 402.
8. Id. at 403.
9. See id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 394).
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the competitors in a market. "At its core," the Diversity Index used the
same formula.'0
The FCC first selected which types of media outlets to include in
calculating the Diversity Index by looking at "consumers' reported
preferences for sources of local news and information."' 1 It then assigned a
relative weight to each type of media outlet based on the popularity of that
source.' 2 Using this procedure, the FCC assigned a weight of 33.8% to
broadcast television, 20.2% to daily newspapers, 8.6% to weekly
newspapers, 24.9% to radio, 2.3% to cable Internet, and 10.2% to other
Internet sources.'
3
To apply the Diversity Index to a specific market, the FCC counted
the number of outlets in the market within each included media type and
assigned each outlet within the same type an equal market share.' 4 So, for
example, each of the twenty-three television stations in the New York City
10. Id. See also infra Table 1 (providing the Diversity Index formula and sample
calculations).
11. 373 F.3d at 403. Local news is the FCC's "recognized indicator of viewpoint
diversity in local markets." Id. at 405 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 394, which states,
"News and public affairs programming is the clearest example of programming that can
provide viewpoint diversity... [and] the appropriate geographic market for viewpoint
diversity is local .... ). Of course, one could wonder whether the FCC's focus on local
news contributes to an artificial sense of an ongoing crisis in viewpoint diversity insofar as
other sources of information and perspectives are becoming substitutes for local news.
However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, providing
an adequate formula for measuring viewpoint diversity could be the first step in a broader
reconsideration of the FCC's regulation of media diversity. See infra Part V.
12. See 373 F.3d at 403 (citing Order, supra note 2, paras. 412,415, 417).
13. Id. Notably absent from this list is cable television. However, the Third Circuit held
that the FCC properly excluded cable television "because of serious doubts as to the extent
that cable provided independent local news ...." meaning news not also provided by local
broadcast television. Id. at 405. But the Third Circuit then held that the same considerations
should have led to the exclusion of Internet sources from the list on the ground that most of
the local news on the Internet is also duplicative. See id. at 405-07. The court also reasoned
that even though the Internet provides a "universe of information" through the Web sites of
individuals and organizations, those Web sites typically fall short of being actual media
outlets because they fail to provide the same aggregation and distillation functions as the
traditional media. Id. at 407. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that "[o]n remand, the
Commission must either exclude the Internet from the media selected for inclusion in the
Diversity Index or provide a better explanation for why it is included in light of the
exclusion of cable." Id. at 408. As a factual matter, one might object that the Third Circuit is
mischaracterizing much of what the Internet has to offer. Cf. id. at 406 n.34 (describing the
Drudge Report, an online source identified by the FCC as an aggregator of news stories).
Again, however, these considerations are outside the scope of this Article, although an
adequate formula for measuring media diversity may be a useful component in a broader
reconsideration of the FCC's role in regulating media diversity on these grounds. See infra
note 66 and accompanying text.
14. 373 F.3d at 403.
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market was assigned an equal 4.3% share of the television market. 5 The
FCC then multiplied the assigned market shares of the outlets within each
media type by the relative weight for that type.' 6 Continuing the prior
example, each broadcast television market share in New York City would
be multiplied by 33.8% (.338) in order to calculate its weighted market
share.'
7
The FCC then derived the weighted ownership shares of a single
entity by combining the weighted market shares of all of the media outlets
owned by that entity.18 So, for example, ABC owned one television station
and four radio stations in New York City. 19 The FCC combined ABC's
weighted television share with its weighted radio share (4.3% multiplied by
.338, which equals 1.45% for the weighted television share combined with
a total of 6.7% for four radio stations multiplied by .249 for the radio
market weight, which equals 1.67%).20 Accordingly, the FCC assigned a
total weighted ownership share of 3.12% to ABC's combination. 2'
Finally, the FCC summed the squares of the weighted ownership
shares to calculate the market's Diversity Index score.22 New York City,
for example, received a total Diversity Index score of 373, to which ABC's
23
squared weighted ownership share had contributed 9.8 points. The FCC
also used this methodology to calculate Diversity Index scores for several
media markets of different sizes, measuring market size by the number of
television stations in the market.24
15. Id. The Third Circuit ultimately held that the FCC could not justify its use of these
assigned equal shares rather than actual-use data in each market and remanded on this
ground as well. See id. at 408-09. This was an independent ground for remand, however,
and all of the other considerations in this Article should apply if the FCC adopts an actual-
use methodology for determining an outlet's market share. As an aside, one can note that the
effect of assuming equal shares rather than using actual-use data would be to understate
concentration as measured by the Diversity Index. See infra Table 1 (showing that a market
with ten equally-weighted outlets would receive a lower Diversity Index score and thus be
deemed more diverse than a market with ten outlets and an uneven distribution of shares).
16. See 373 F.3d at 404.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Order, supra note 2, app. C.
24. See 373 F.3d at 404 (citing Order, supra note 2, app. D). Appendix C of the Order
also contains sample calculations for ten of these markets. Order, supra note 2, app. C.
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2. Consolidation Scenarios
Next, the FCC looked at how the markets' Diversity Index scores
would change given different hypothetical consolidation scenarios.25 The
FCC considered seven possible combinations: (1) one newspaper and one
television station; (2) one television station and all of the radio stations
allowed under the local radio rule;26 (3) one newspaper and all of the radio
stations allowed under the local radio rule; (4) one newspaper, one
television station, and half of the radio stations allowed under the local
radio rule; (5) two television stations; (6) one newspaper and two television
stations; and (7) one newspaper, two television stations, and all of the radio
stations allowed under the local radio rule.2 7 To determine the hypothetical
effects of such combinations on media diversity, the FCC compared the
Diversity Index scores of the markets before and after the combinations;
the difference, an increase in the Diversity Index score, provided the FCC's
measure of the loss of diversity due to the consolidation scenario.28
3. The Cross-Media Limits
Finally, the FCC set the Cross-Media Limits, which varied with the
size of the market, purportedly based on whether or not the relevant
consolidation scenarios "resulted in acceptable increases to the average
Diversity Index score[]" for that size of market.29 For markets with three or
fewer television stations, the FCC prohibited all newspaper/television,
newspaper/radio, and radio/television combinations.3 ° In markets with nine
or more television stations, the FCC imposed no limits on cross-media
ownership.3' In markets with four to eight television stations, the FCC rule
allowed all of the scenarios except for two: a combination of a newspaper
and two television stations, or a combination of a newspaper, two television
stations, and all of the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule.32
25. 373 F.3d at 404.
26. The local radio ownership rule is an independent rule, established by statute, which
limits the number of commercial radio stations a single entity can own in a market based
upon the total number of commercial radio stations in that market. Id. at 387 n.9 (citing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 110 (codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.)).
27. 373 F.3d at 404 (citing Order, supra note 2, app. D).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 466). Obviously, these are not separate rules.
The rule prohibiting a combination of a newspaper and two television stations also prohibits
a combination of a newspaper, two television stations, and any additional media outlets.
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B. The Third Circuit's Review
After analyzing the Diversity Index and its use by the FCC, the Third
Circuit held that the FCC: (1) had not justified its choice and weighting of
the specific kinds of media outlets to include in the Diversity Index; (2) had
not justified its assumption of equal market shares among media outlets of
the same kind for the purposes of calculating the Diversity Index; and (3)
had not rationally derived the Cross-Media Limits from the Diversity Index
results.33 The last of these three holdings is the focus of this Subpart.
The Third Circuit held that "[a]lthough the Commission is entitled to
deference in deciding where to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable increases in markets' Diversity Index scores, we do not affirm
the seemingly inconsistent manner in which the line was drawn. 34 To
support this conclusion, the Third Circuit highlighted the FCC's chart of
the effects of different "consolidation scenarios.,,35 As the Third Circuit
noted, the proposed "Cross-Media Limits allow[] some combinations
where the increases in Diversity Index scores were generally higher than
for other combinations that were not allowed. 36
The court particularly noted that in midsized markets, the markets
with four to eight television stations, one combination-a newspaper,
television station, and half of the radio stations allowed under the local
radio rule-allowed by the FCC's rule caused "considerably higher"
Diversity Index score increases than the other combinations allowed by the
FCC.37 In fact, this combination generally led to higher increases than a
combination that the FCC did not allow-a newspaper and two television
stations .3
The Third Circuit concluded that "[t]he Commission's failure to
provide any explanation for this glaring inconsistency is without doubt
arbitrary and capricious, and so provides further basis for remand of the
Cross-Media Limits., 39 The court rejected the argument that the relevant
difference between a combination of a newspaper and two television
stations and a combination of a newspaper, one television station, and half
of the allowed radio stations is that "a newspaper will benefit more from
... the consolidation with its first-acquired TV station than with
33. See id. at 404-11.
34. Id. at411.
35. Id. at 409-10 (citing Order, supra note 2, app. D). See also infra Table 2
(reproducing the FCC's chart).
36. 373 F.3d at 411.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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subsequently acquired stations." 4 The court concluded that this argument
"does not address why the newspaper + 1 TV station + 50% allowed radio
stations combination was permitted when its Diversity Index score
increases were overall much greater than the Diversity Index score
increases for other allowed combinations. ' 41
As this exchange illustrates, the Third Circuit was implicitly adopting
the Diversity Index as an appropriate measure of media diversity and then
requiring the FCC to justify any departures from the implied ordering of
consolidation scenarios based on this measure. Moreover, the Third Circuit
was requiring the FCC to justify not only departures where scenarios with
similar effects on Diversity Index scores were treated differently, but also
departures where scenarios with dissimilar effects on Diversity Index
scores were treated the same-a very robust use of the FCC's own formula,
despite the FCC's disclaimer that the Diversity Index is "a blunt tool
capable only of capturing and measuring large effects or trends in typical
markets.
' 42
C. The Underlying Issue: A Fatal Flaw in the Diversity Index
Although the Third Circuit based its holding on inconsistent line-
drawing, the court actually understated the underlying problems with the
FCC's use of the Diversity Index. The FCC's real problem is not finding a
consistent line to draw when using the Diversity Index; instead, the
Diversity Index itself is fatally flawed because it cannot simultaneously
satisfy two underlying assumptions about the relationship between media
market share and media diversity. This Subpart first explains how the
Diversity Index, as designed by the FCC and adopted by the Third Circuit,
was intended to satisfy these two assumptions: (1) diversity in a media
market should decrease with ownership concentration; and (2) the
contribution to diversity of an individual entity, its diversity importance,
should increase with the weighted market shares of that entity's outlets.
Section 2 shows that the Diversity Index as it is currently structured cannot
40. Id. at 411 n.41 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 467).
41. Id.
42. Order, supra note 2, para. 398. See also 373 F.3d at 473 (Scirica, J. dissenting in
part, concurring in part) (arguing that the Cross-Media Limits were reasonable and should
be upheld, even though the Diversity Index results "do not correspond to the Commission's
final rule for all combinations in all markets," because the Diversity Index nonetheless "lent
transparency and empirical footing to this massive undertaking"). The fact that the Third
Circuit was willing to use the FCC's own formula, even with these disclaimers, to justify
remanding the FCC's rule lends support to the claim that adopting a formulaic approach to
measuring media diversity can limit the discretion of government officials. See infra note
66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] MEASURING MEDIA MARKET DIVERSITY
simultaneously satisfy both of these assumptions. Accordingly, Part II
concludes with the suggestion that the FCC should consider alternatives to
the Diversity Index.
1. The Two Assumptions Underlying the Diversity Index
On the one hand, the Diversity Index is designed to treat increased
ownership concentration in a media market as having a negative impact on
diversity. Like the HHI, the Diversity Index sums the squares of the
weighted ownership shares. Mathematically, this formula can measure
increases in concentration in the market because each entity's contribution
to the concentration score before summation does not just increase linearly
with its weighted ownership share, in which case the distribution of
ownership shares would have no effect on the total score of the market
once all of the entities' shares were summed. Rather, each entity's
contribution to the concentration score before summation increases
exponentially, making the total Diversity Index score of the market
following the summation dependent on the distribution of ownership
shares.43
On the other hand, the Diversity Index also seems designed to treat
higher weighted market shares as representing a greater contribution to a
market's diversity. As the Third Circuit noted in Prometheus, the FCC, in
justifying its relative weighting of media types, stated that it has "no reason
to believe that all media are of equal importance" 44 and that "[n]ot all
voices.., speak with the same volume., 45 The court further noted that the
FCC's stated reason for departing from a simple voice-counting test and
moving to the Diversity Index methodology was that it wanted to take into
account the "diversity importance" of hypothetical merging parties.46
Indeed, the FCC suggested that, for example, "if radio has less diversity
weight than television, then a merger of a television station and a radio
station will cause less of a loss of diversity than will a merger of two
television stations." 47
Thus, when the Diversity Index calculates the weighted market shares
of media outlets by multiplying the outlets' assigned market shares with
weighting factors derived from the consumer popularity of various media
sources, it is creating a positive correlation between the weighted market
43. See 373 F.3d at 403 (discussing the mathematical characteristics of the HHI). See
also infra Table 1 (providing sample calculations using the Diversity Index).
44. 373 F.3d at 408 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 409) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. Id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 445) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 396).
47. Order, supra note 2, para. 396.
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share of an outlet and the calculated "importance" of that outlet, or the
"volume" of that voice, in the market. Consequently, this portion of the
Diversity Index scheme assumes that there should be a positive correlation
between a media outlet's weighted market share and the magnitude of its
contribution to diversity in the market.
The FCC did not clearly explain why it believed that greater actual
use of an outlet, as represented by its market share, should represent greater
diversity importance. The FCC stated, "[O]ur method for measuring
viewpoint diversity weights outlets based on the way people actually use
them rather than what is actually available as a local news source. We
adopt this approach out of an abundance of caution because we are
protecting our core policy objective of viewpoint diversity. ''48 But the FCC
had previously stated in its Order that "[v]iewpoint diversity refers to
availability of a wide range of information and political perspectives on
important issues,"49 and that "what ultimately matters here is the range of
choices available to the public . . . .50 Accordingly, despite the FCC's
claim that it was adopting this actual-use methodology out of an
"abundance of caution," it appears that the FCC was in fact implicitly
redefining viewpoint diversity by shifting its focus to the actual use of
media outlets.5'
The Third Circuit implicitly reached a similar conclusion when it
criticized the FCC's assignment of equal market shares within each media
type because that assignment generated "absurd results. ' 2 Focusing on the
New York City market, the court compared a community college television
station's weighted ownership share of 1.5% with the New York Times
48. Id. para. 399.
49. Id. para. 393 (emphasis added).
50. Id. para. 394 (emphasis added).
51. Id. para. 399. Assessing whether this was a permissible or justifiable revision of the
FCC's definition of viewpoint diversity is outside the scope of this Article. Cf. FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 (1978) ("Diversity and its effects are...
elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured .... ") (quoting Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Brdcst v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Nonetheless, it may be
worth observing that the FCC describes its diversity goal as "fostering competition in the
marketplace of ideas." Order, supra note 2, para. 393 (internal quotations omitted).
Obviously, that metaphorical market does not include only media outlets on the supply side
and media consumers on the demand side. Instead, presumably, once media outlets have
supplied information or perspectives to their consumers, many of those consumers will then
resupply those ideas to other participants in this marketplace. In that sense, ideas first
transmitted through media outlets with a larger market share will be more competitive
simply by virtue of having a larger number of resuppliers in these second-stage transactions.
In other words, there is a straightforward sense in which ideas first transmitted by relatively
unpopular media outlets will be less available to second-stage consumers of ideas.
52. 373 F.3d at 408.
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Company's weighted ownership share, derived from a co-owned
newspaper and radio station, of 1.4%.53 The court concluded, "A Diversity
Index that requires us to accept that a community college television station
makes a greater contribution to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate
that includes the third-largest newspaper in America also requires us to
abandon both logic and reality., 54 Consequently, the court also appears to
have concluded that an entity's weighted ownership share should correlate
positively with the magnitude of that entity's contribution to diversity.55
2. The Diversity Index Cannot Simultaneously Satisfy These Two
Assumptions
The Diversity Index scheme, as used by the FCC, cannot
simultaneously satisfy these two assumptions: (1) diversity in a media
market should decrease with ownership concentration; and (2) the
contribution to diversity of an individual entity should correlate positively
with the weighted market shares of that entity's outlets. By calculating the
Diversity Index score as the sum of the squares of the weighted ownership
shares, the Diversity Index score contribution of a given entity increases
exponentially with the weighted market shares of its outlets. Consequently,
the Diversity Index score positively correlates with both increased
ownership concentration, as traditionally measured by the HHI formula,
and increased weighted market shares on an outlet-by-outlet basis.
Increases in the Diversity Index score of a media market could thus be
treated as representing decreases in diversity, in accordance with
Assumption (1). But such a scheme, by implication, would treat an
individual entity's contribution to diversity as correlating negatively, not
positively, with the weighted market shares of its outlets, thus violating
Assumption (2).6 Conversely, treating increases in the Diversity Index
53. Id.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Again, a critical review of the court's decision is beyond the scope of this Article.
But it is certainly worth noting that the court could have questioned this entire approach,
perhaps even remanding the case to the FCC on the ground that it had not justified defining
viewpoint diversity with respect to actual use of media outlets. Instead, the court not only
accepted this definition, but also used it as a substantive basis for reviewing the details of
the FCC's Diversity Index methodology.
56. For comparison, it may be worth noting that an HHI analysis of a media market for
the purpose of gauging concentration effects would also implicitly treat an entity's
individual contribution to those effects as increasing with the market shares of that entity's
outlets. Of course, in that context, such an assumption is appropriate. In other words, it
would not be objectionable to say that a media company with a large share of the media
market, such as the New York Times Company in New York, contributes more to media
concentration than a company with a smaller share of the media market. Again, the problem
in this context is that the New York Times Company is also, by the assumptions of the Third
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score as representing increases in diversity would satisfy Assumption (2),
but would then violate Assumption (1).
Consequently, any use of the Diversity Index scheme is bound to
violate the basic assumptions of the Third Circuit, and indeed the FCC
itself. Accordingly, to truly satisfy the Third Circuit on remand, the FCC
should consider alternatives to the Diversity Index. Part III presents two
such alternatives, one proposed by Professor Noam and one original to this
Article.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVERSITY INDEX
As noted in the Introduction, there has been surprisingly little
commentary on the Third Circuit's discussion of the Diversity Index and its
remand of the Cross-Media Limits. Professor Eli Noam, however, broadly
addressed the FCC's attempts to measure media market diversity in a
column for the Financial Times Online edition.57 Professor Noam was not
primarily concerned with the issues discussed in this Article, but he also
proposed an alternative to the Diversity Index. Accordingly, this Part
begins with Professor Noam's analysis of the Diversity Index and his
proposal of an alternative, which I will call the Noam Index ("NI").58
Subpart B then proposes an original index specifically designed to
simultaneously satisfy the two assumptions of the FCC and Third Circuit.
A. The Noam Index
Professor Noam identified two problems with the Diversity Index.
Noting that the Diversity Index is based on the HHI used in conventional
analysis of market concentration for antitrust purposes, he stated, "[t]he
issue is partly whether the concentration threshold for media should be
lower, and also whether the HHI methodology itself accounts sufficiently
for media pluralism. ' 59 Addressing the second issue, Professor Noam
argued that while the HHI is a good measure of market power, it fails to
properly account for pluralism.60 Contending that both pluralism and
Circuit and FCC, contributing more to the diversity of that market than entities owning less
"important," or lower "volume," media outlets.
57. Eli Noam, How to Measure Media Concentration, FT.coM, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/da3Obf5e-fa9d-1 ld8-9a71-00000e251 lc8.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005). Noam is a Professor of Economics and Finance at the Columbia Business School and
Director of the Columbia University Institute for Tele-Information.
58. Following the convention established with the HHI, I will use personal names to
identify the indices in this Article, with the exception of the Diversity Index.
59. Noam, supra note 57. This Article focuses primarily on the second of these issues.
60. Id. Professor Noam described an example of a radio market:
[I]f [] two smaller stations were replaced by 20 stations, each with 1 per cent [sic]
of the market, the H1 would decline only slightly, from 3400 to 3220. Yet the
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market power are important considerations, he concluded that "one should
not have to choose between a measure of market power (the HHI) or of
pluralism ....
Accordingly, Professor Noam proposed an alternative to the Diversity
Index that incorporates both concerns. The NI takes the HHI as a measure
of market power and then divides it by the square root of the number of
voices in the market.62 As Professor Noam explained, the more voices there
are in a market, the lower the NI score will be.63 To provide for a practical
test, he advocated limiting the counting of voices to those above a certain
size threshold, and he proposed 1%.64 Finally, he proposed that this same
approach could be used for cross-media analysis, "since a company might
have no special market power in any particular medium but be involved in
several media so that overall it would hold significant power, especially if
it were to have multiple holdings in one city. ' 6
5
As an aside, it is worth noting that the NI does not appear to deal with
the underlying problem identified in this Article-the inability of the
Diversity Index to simultaneously satisfy Assumptions (1) and (2). Rather,
the NI is designed to give extra weight to the loss or addition of voices
when assessing media concentration. But the NI provides a useful
comparison for the purposes of this Article because it is also a formulaic
alternative to the Diversity Index, designed to fulfill the same basic
purpose-measuring the media diversity of individual markets. Professor
Noam argued broadly in favor of such an approach:
[To some], any numerical test is suspect as mechanistic. They would
prefer a case-by-case consideration of many factors relevant to a media
market. But this would leave a judgment call over media ownership to
government officials able to reward friends and punish enemies, or
enable powerful media companies to thwart unfavourable decisions-
both undesirable options given the inherently adversarial relationship
of government and media. This argues for a relatively clear-cut test,
with a relatively clear-cut methodology. 66
diversity of the local radio market would clearly be significantly increased by the
presence of 18 additional radio station providers.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also infra Table 1 (using sample calculations for the Noam Index).
63. Noam, supra note 57.
64. Id. Unfortunately, Professor Noam did not specify exactly how this percentage
should be calculated.
65. Id. Professor Noam did not explain exactly how his index would apply to the cross-
media case, but this Article will assume that the NI could be applied to weighted market
shares as determined by the FCC.
66. Id. In response to Professor Noam, Professor Richard Epstein argued that in light of
the online media market, including such entities as "bloggers," the actual number of media
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Accepting the potential benefits of such formulaic approaches, the
next section of this Article proposes another alternative to the Diversity
Index---one specifically designed to address the underlying assumptions of
the Third Circuit and the FCC.
B. The Hill Index
67
Holding aside the issues of how to select media types, how to weigh
those types, and then how to assign market shares to outlets within those
types, we can assume that the FCC started with appropriately-weighted
market shares.68 As with the Diversity Index and the NI, the Hill Index
("HI") would combine the weighted market shares of co-owned outlets to
derive weighted ownership shares. However, instead of summing the
squares of these shares, the HI would sum the square roots of these
shares.69
As with the Diversity Index, an individual entity's contribution to the
market's HI score would increase with the entity's weighted market share.
Accordingly, under Assumption (2), increases in this modified Diversity
Index score should be treated as representing increases, not decreases, in
diversity. In other words, a greater HI score represents a more diverse
market, and a lower HI score represents a less diverse market. °
voices is much larger than Professor Noan assumes. Richard A. Epstein, No Need to Fight
Yesterday's Wars, F.CoM, Aug. 30, 2004, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/da30bf5e-fa9d-1ld8-
9a71-00000e251 lc8.html (last visited, Oct. 20, 2005). Also in response to Professor Noam,
Thomas Hazlett argued that the broader context is a "regulatory failure" in the broadcast
segment of the media market, and he concluded that courts should extend the protections of
the First Amendment from print media to all "communications." Thomas W. Hazlett, The
'Noam Index', FT.coM, Aug. 30, 2004, http://news.ft.comcms/s/da30bf5e-fa9d-1 ld8-9a71-
00000e251 lc8.html (last visited, Oct. 4, 2005). Taken together, these responses suggest that
the proper conclusion may be that there should be a more limited role for the FCC in this
area, and perhaps no role at all. Although such an argument is mostly outside the scope of
this Article, it is worth noting that a formulaic approach to measuring media diversity,
properly applied in light of actual facts, may bolster such arguments. See infra Part V. In
that sense, Professor Noam's observation that a formulaic approach limits the ability of
government officials to "reward friends and punish enemies" applies equally well to these
broader questions of whether the government should be regulating at all. Noam, supra note
57.
67. At the risk of seeming immodest, this Article will continue to use the convention of
identifying indices by proper names for the sake of clarity.
68. Examining these prior steps is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth
noting that doing so would be one way to initiate the broader discussion of whettler any
ongoing regulation in these areas is warranted. See generally Epstein, supra note 66. See
also supra notes 13, 15, 66, and accompanying text.
69. See infra Table 1 (comparing, side-by-side, the formulas used in the Diversity
Index, NI, and HI).
70. It may be important to stress the contrast between the HI and the Diversity Index
and NI. In both of the latter indices, a greater score indicates a less diverse market. With the
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With the HI formula, an entity's contribution to diversity increases in
a diminishing, not increasing, fashion as its weighted ownership share
increases. 7' As a result, treating increases in the HI score as representing
increases in diversity would not violate Assumption (1). Indeed, decreases
in the HI score could be treated as representing decreases in diversity under
both assumptions.
For example, a media market with only one outlet, and thus with a
weighted ownership share of 100, would have an HI score of 10 (the square
root of 100). For comparison, using the same share of 100 in the Diversity
Index formula would result in a score of 10,000 (the square of 100).
Moving to a market with 10 separately-owned outlets, each with an equal
weighted share of 10, the HI score would increase to 31.6 (the sum of 10
square roots of 10). By contrast, the Diversity Index score would decrease
to 1,000 (the sum of 10 squares of 10). Similarly, moving then to a market
still with 10 separate outlets, but one with a weighted share of 50, one with
a share of 10, and the remaining 8 with shares of 5, would result in a
decrease in the HI score to 28.1, and an increase in the Diversity Index
score to 2,800. Alternatively, moving from a market with 10 equal outlets
to a market with 8 equal outlets, each with a share of 12.5, would result in a
decrease of the HI score to 28.3, and an increase of the Diversity Index
score to 1,250.72
As this example demonstrates, treating decreases in the HI score as
decreases in diversity is consistent with the assumption that increases in
ownership concentration in media markets correlate with decreases in
media diversity. Unlike both the Diversity Index and the NI, the HI
accommodates both of the assumptions shared by the Third Circuit and
FCC.
In order to determine whether the HI is useful in practice, including
for the purpose of evaluating the effects of consolidation scenarios, it must
be tested. Part IV considers the results of applying all three indices to a
sample market: Altoona, Pennsylvania.
HI, in contrast, a greater score indicates a more diverse market. See infra Table 1
(comparing sample calculations for all three indices).
71. For example, an entity with a weighted ownership share of 10 would contribute
3.16 (the square root of 10) to the HI score. Increasing the entity's weighted ownership
share to 20 would increase its contribution to 4.47-an increase of 1.31. But then increasing
its share from 20 to 30 would only increase its contribution to 5.48-a further increase of
1.01. As this example demonstrates, the marginal increase in its contribution to the HI score
decreases as an entity grows, a mathematical consequence of using the square root function.
72. See infra Table 1 (comparing the sample calculations across the Diversity Index,
NI, and HI).
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IV. A TEST CASE: ALTOONA, PENNSYLVANIA
The natural next step would be to apply the NI and HI to all of the
data underlying the FCC's chart of consolidation scenarios, comparing the
results with the Diversity Index. Unfortunately, the FCC did not provide all
of this information in its published Order.7 However, the FCC did provide
sample base Diversity Index calculations for ten markets in Appendix C of
the Order. For one of those ten markets-Altoona, Pennsylvania-the FCC
also provided two sample calculations for hypothetical consolidation
scenarios.74 As it turns out, Altoona is a suitable test case for the NI and HI
because it fits within the range of markets subject to the rules held
inconsistent by the Third Circuit: Altoona has six television stations,
placing it within the disputed range."
This Part begins by confirming that the application of the Diversity
Index to the Altoona market leads to the same sort of inconsistent results
that the court identified with respect to the FCC's Cross-Media Limits.
Subpart B then applies the NI and HI to the Altoona market, comparing the
results given the relevant consolidation scenarios. On the basis of this
comparison, this Part confirms that only the HI simultaneously satisfies the
two basic assumptions shared by the FCC and the court. Moreover, this
Part also concludes that the HI puts greater practical weight on the loss of
voices than the NI, and thus is also better-suited to address the issues of
media pluralism that motivated Professor Noam to create an alternative
index.
A. Altoona and the Diversity Index
Before applying the NI and HI to the Altoona market, it is necessary
to check whether applying the Diversity Index to the combination scenarios
as applied in Altoona would lead to results comparable to those represented
in the FCC's summary chart. One immediate difficulty is that there are not
unique ways to carry out the scenarios described by the FCC. Altoona
apparently has both a daily and a weekly newspaper, although the weekly
newspaper remained unnamed in the FCC's chart, and thus the
combinations involving a newspaper could take two different forms.76
Similarly, combinations involving multiple radio stations could be created
out of different combinations of the existing radio groups. For example, the
73. See Order, supra note 2, app. D.
74. See Order, supra note 2, app. C.
75. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. See also infra Table 3 (reproducing the FCC's
analysis of the Altoona media market).
76. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. See also infra Table 3.
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local radio rule allows a combination of up to five stations,77 and in
Altoona this result could be reached by combining three independent
stations with one two-station group, or an independent station with a four-
station group, and so on. Finally, combinations involving two television
stations could be formed by acquiring two independent stations, or one
two-station group.
To resolve these issues, this Article calculates results using several
different scenarios, taking the average of the results. So, for combinations
involving a newspaper, scenarios for each newspaper were calculated. For
combinations involving two television stations, scenarios were calculated
both for combining two independent stations and for one two-station group.
Hence, for the combination involving a newspaper and two television
stations, four scenarios were calculated, as a result of compounding both of
these rules.
For the radio combinations involving five stations, scenarios for a 1-
1-1-2 combination and 1-4 combination were calculated. For radio
combinations involving three stations, scenarios for a 1-1-1 combination
and a single three-station group were calculated. Again, when combined
with the newspaper rule, this rule resulted in four possible scenarios.78
As noted above, this Article also uses combinations involving three
stations when calculating the scenario involving acquisition of half of the
radio stations allowed by the local rule. Half of the five stations allowed by
the local rules would have been 2.5 stations, and it is unclear whether the
FCC intended to round up or down in such circumstances. However, as it
turned out, the Altoona market failed to mirror the results of the FCC's
chart when only two stations were used. Since, as discussed below, using
three stations did bring Altoona into alignment with the chart results, that
interpretation was adopted for the sake of this test case.
The result of applying these rules to the Altoona market is shown in
Table 4. As noted by the Third Circuit with respect to the overall chart, a
combination of a newspaper, television station, and half of the allowed
radio stations, three in this test case, led to a greater average increase in the
77. Because Altoona has fourteen radio stations, the local radio ownership rule provides
that a single party can own up to five stations. 373 F.3d at 387 n.9 (citing
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. at 110 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)).
78. As an aside, this Article did not calculate results for two combinations on the FCC
chart: the newspaper, radio, and two television station combination, and the two television
station combination. The first combination was uncontroversially prohibited, and calculating
the results after applying the above rules would have required eight scenarios. The second
combination was uncontroversially allowed and mathematically uninteresting. See generally
id. at 411 (reviewing the FCC's chart).
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Diversity Index (386) than a combination of a newspaper and two
television stations (356). Similarly, the former combination led to a
considerably higher average increase than any of the other allowed
combinations: a television station and five radio stations (142), a
newspaper and five radio stations (297), or a newspaper and one television
station (162). As a result, the Altoona market seems to present a specific
case of the general problem identified by the Third Circuit, at least when
the FCC's combination scenarios are interpreted as above.
B. Applying the Noam and Hill Indices
Having confirmed that Altoona is a suitable test case, this Subpart
applies the NI and HI to the Altoona market. The results of applying the NI
and HI are also summarized in Table 4.
The NI starts with a base of 240-the HHI score of 960 divided by
the square root of the number of voices. Since there are 16 voices in
Altoona the base-case denominator in the NI is 4.79 The average change in
the NI for each combination is represented as a positive number, indicating
a loss of diversity. The HI starts with a base of 37.73.80 As noted above, the
average change in the HI for each combination is negative, also
representing a loss of diversity.
One obvious question is whether either the NI or the HI could shield
the FCC from the Third Circuit's conclusion that the FCC engaged in
inconsistent line-drawing. The answer is no. Both alternative indices led to
the same result: a combination of one newspaper, one television station,
and three radio stations averaged higher than a combination of one
newspaper and two television stations, and substantially higher than any
other allowed combination.
With the details of the Altoona market before us, it is now obvious
why this result occurs. The three additional radio stations have
approximately the same total weighted share (5.4) as the one additional
television station (5.6).81 Accordingly, a combination of a newspaper,
television station, and three radio stations will result in a media group with
approximately the same weighted share as a combination of a newspaper
79. Note that the Internet is represented by two voices: cable and "other." Although this
approach accords with the general methodology of the FCC, and although commentary on
that methodology is outside the scope of this Article, it is once again worth noting that this
analysis is controversial at best. See generally Epstein, supra note 66.
80. See infra Table 5 (breaking down the Altoona market as analyzed by the HI).
81. The numbers underlying these calculations are found in Table 5. A single radio
station has a weighted share of 1.779. Thus, three radio stations would have a weighted
share of 5.4 (after rounding). As Table 5 also indicates, a single independent television
station has a weighted share of 5.633, or 5.6 after rounding.
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and two television stations. However, the former combination will, on
average, eliminate more independent outlets than the latter. For that reason,
by any of these measures, the former will lead to a greater net loss of
diversity.
The NI only underscores this effect by giving greater weight to the
greater loss of voices caused by the radio combination. The HI leads to the
same result because the positive benefits of creating a combination with a
greater weighted share are approximately equal in each case, allowing the
loss of additional voices to dominate. All three indices support the Third
Circuit's holding that the FCC had drawn an inconsistent line by allowing
this particular combination.
The various indices do, however, disagree on other issues. According
to the Diversity Index, the next-worst combination is the combination of a
newspaper and two television stations, a combination the FCC sought to
prevent. In contrast, the next-worst combination for both the NI and HI is
the combination of a newspaper and all the radio stations allowed by the
local rule. As it was designed to do, the NI picked out a scenario which led
to a significant reduction in the number of voices. The HI reached the same
result for a slightly different reason: the radio stations each added relatively
little to the voice of the newspaper, so the marginal increase in the voice of
the combination was heavily outweighed by the loss of the independent
voices.82 The NI and HI both indicate that the FCC should also reconsider
allowing this combination but prohibiting a combination of newspaper and
two television stations.83
So far in this discussion, both the NI and HI have lived up to their
intended purposes. At the next stage, however, the NI arguably breaks
down. After the newspaper and full radio combination, the next-worst
combination for the HI is the television station and full radio combination.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the next-worst combination for the NI is
not that combination, but rather the newspaper and two television station
combination-even though the combination picked out by the HI results in
the loss of more voices.84
82. For example, the combined daily newspaper and radio group contributed 5.398
points to the HI score. Separately, the components of this group had been contributing either
10.388 points (1-1-1-2 scenario) or 8.501 points (1-4 scenario). Similarly, the combined
weekly newspaper and radio group contributed 4.177 points to the HI score. Separately, the
components had been contributing either 8.813 or 6.926. See infra Table 5.
83. Of course, the FCC could address this problem in several different ways:
disallowing both combinations; allowing both combinations; or, inverting its prior rule by
allowing combinations of a newspaper and two television stations, but disallowing
combinations of a newspaper and all the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule.
84. It may be worth recalling that Professor Noam had provided an example of media
pluralism based on increasing the number of radio stations. See Noam, supra note 57.
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This occurs because the HHI, as indicated by the Diversity Index,
increases more rapidly in response to the combination of one big player (a
newspaper) and two medium players (the television stations) than it does to
the combination of one medium player (the television station) and five
small players (the radio stations). In the NI, the numerator's rapid increase,
which is a consequence of the summing of the squares of combined market
shares, can outweigh the denominator's gradual decrease, which is a
consequence of taking the square root of the number of voices.
In the HI, by contrast, the fact that the combination resulting from a
television station and five radio stations is smaller than the combination
resulting from a newspaper and two radio stations actually counts against
the former. That is because the lower strength of the smaller combination's
voice is more easily outweighed by the loss of additional voices.85
In summary, like the Diversity Index, the NI violates Assumption (2)
by treating larger combinations as contributing less to diversity. As a result
of doing so, it arguably violates its own preference for a greater number of
voices: it treats increasingly large combinations as an increasing problem,
while treating a diminishing number of voices as a diminishing problem. In
contrast, as discussed above, the HI simultaneously satisfies both
Assumption (1) and Assumption (2). Moreover, the HI can actually put
greater practical weight on the loss of voices than can the NI. When an
increasing number of small voices are combined, the HI registers for each
additional voice a fixed loss of diversity and a decreasing marginal benefit
in terms of the "strength" of the combined voice. Consequently, the HI
both provides an internally consistent measure of media diversity and also
effectively fosters media pluralism.
V. CONCLUSION
As Professor Noam implied, a formulaic test for media diversity could
have the beneficial effect of constraining government regulators who
might, intentionally or unintentionally, abuse excessive discretion. In
Prometheus, the Third Circuit, somewhat surprisingly, did not defer to the
FCC's discretion with respect to the Cross-Media Limits, and that decision
was facilitated by the FCC's inconsistent use of a formulaic test, the
85. The combined television and radio group contributed only 3.811 points to the HI
score; whereas, individually the components had contributed 8.261 (1-1-1-2) or 6.374 (14).
In contrast, the newspaper and two television station groups contributed 5.614 (daily) and
4.452 (weekly), compared with a prior total of either 9.246 (daily plus 1-1) and 7.857 (daily
plus 2), or 7.671 (weekly plus 1-1) and 6.282 (weekly plus 2). In other words, according to
the HI, the diversity lost through combination was roughly equivalent in each of these cases,
but the strength of the resulting combination was lower for the television and radio group,
resulting in a greater net diversity loss for that combination. See infra Table 5.
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Diversity Index. But the court also implicitly undermined the entire
Diversity Index scheme because the Diversity Index fails to coherently
reflect the assumptions of the court, and indeed the FCC itself, with respect
to diversity in media markets.
Placing this discussion in a broader context, Professor Noam
suggested important considerations of pluralism that also militate in favor
of adopting an alternative to the Diversity Index. Although Professor Noam
suggested his own index, the Altoona test case indicates that the HI not
only reconciles the assumptions of the Third Circuit and the FCC, unlike
the NI, but also surpasses the NI itself with respect to protecting media
pluralism.
However, determining the most appropriate index of media diversity
is only the first step in a broader project. With a proper understanding of
the facts of media markets, applying an appropriate index may do more
than simply sort the possible regulations with respect to something like
cross-media ownership. Rather, applying such an index may suggest that in
light of modem media markets, no such regulations are warranted. The first
step in making such an argument, however, is to find a rule which can
reasonably and effectively be used to bind the regulators.
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TABLE 1
SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF DIVERSITY INDEX, NOAM INDEX, AND
HILL INDEX, WITH SAMPLE CALCULATIONS
Diversity Index Noam Index Hill Index
Formula 7(w2 ) (Y(w 2))14N Y('1w)
(w=weighted (N=number of
market share) outlets)
Examples
1 x 100 10= 10000 10000/41 = 10000 4100 = 10
lox 10 10 x (102) = 1000 1000/410 = 316 10 x 4 10 = 31.6
50,10, 8 x 5 502 + 10'+ 8 x (52 ) 2800/410 = 885 4 50 + 4 10 + 8 x
= 2800 45 = 28.1
8 x 12.5 8 x (12.52) = 1250 1250/48 = 442 8 x 412.5 = 28.3
Source: The figures are derived from sample calculations. The entries
in the grid apply the formula in the first (boxed) row to the numbers in the
first column.
Note: For Diversity and Noam Indices, higher scores represent less
diversity. For the Hill Index, higher scores represent more diversity. Note
that the numerator for the Noam Index is always equal to the Diversity
Index score.
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TABLE 2
REPRODUCTION OF THE FCC CHART SUMMARIZING
AVERAGE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY INDEX GIVEN VARIOUS
HYPOTHETICAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS
Base Case Average Change in Diversity Index, Resulting from Mergers
TV Average 100% Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper 2 TV Newspaper + Newspaper
stations in Diversity Radio + 1 + 100% + 1 TV +1 TV stations 2 TV stations +100%
market Index score TV station Radio station station + Radio+2 TV
50% Radio stations
1 1701 651 271 910 1321 1
2 1316 301 335 731 1009
3 1027 390 242 331 515
4 928 138 236 242 408
5 911 111 263 223 393 91 376 846
6 889 79 239 200 340 63 357 688
7 753 73 171 121 247 47 242 533
8 885 79 299 152 314 36 308 734
9 705 64 198 86 207 28 172 473
10 635 56 107 51 119 23 101 292
15 595 43 149 48 145 10 97 302
20 612 49 222 40 128 6 80 350
Source: Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 409-10 (citing Order, supra note 2,
app. D).
Note: Shaded areas indicate combinations prohibited by the FCC's
proposed rules. Dark boxes indicate areas of contention where the Third
Circuit found that the FCC had drawn an inconsistent line.
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TABLE 3
REPRODUCTION OF FCC's CHART ANALYZING THE ALTOONA, PA
MEDIA MARKET.
Media Market Ownership Shares Percentage Share of Media
Market
% of % of Parent Company # of % %Share Cross Col. F
Media Medium -Stations Share (AxBxE) Ownership Squared
A B C -.. G H
- -
Broadcast Clear Channel 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Television 100.0% Communications
33.8% Cornerstone TV, 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Inc.
Cox Broadcasting 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Peak Media LLC 2 33.3 11.3 126.9
Penn State 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
University_
Allegheny 3 21.4 5.3 28.5
Radio Mountain Network
24.9% Altoona Trans 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Audio Corp Inc
B&F Enterprises 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Forever 4 28.6 7.1 50.6
Broadcasting
Incorporated
Martinsburg 2 14.3 3.6 12.7
Broadcasting
Sounds Good 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Incorporated
Vital Licenses 2 14.3 3.6 12.7
Daily Altoona Mirror 1 100.0 20.2 409.9
Newspaper 70.3%
28.8% Weekly Weekly Newspaper 1 100.0 8.6 73.2
29.7%
Cable Cable 1 100.0 2.3 5.2
Internet 18.3% 1 1 1
12.5% Other Dial-up, DSL, and 1 100.0 10.2 104.3
181.7% other
Cross-Ownership None
Diversity Index (Sum of Column H) 960
Source: Order, supra note 2, app. C.
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TABLE 4
AVERAGE CHANGE IN INDICIES RESULTING FROM HYPOTHETICAL
CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS IN THE ALTOONA MEDIA MARKET
Index Base 100% 100% Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper
Case Radio Radio plus plus I TV plus 1 TV plus 2 TV
plus 1 TV Newspaper station station stations
Station plus 50%
Radio
Diversity 960 142 297 162 386 356
Noan 240 66 110 50 134 106
Hill 1 37.73 1 (3.51) 1(3.87) 1(1.66) 1(4.24) (2.73)
Source: Order, supra note 2, app. C. The basic methodology for
applying each index is explained throughout this Article.
Note: Again, increases in the Diversity and Noam Indices represent a
loss of diversity, as do decreases in the Hill Index.
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TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF ALTOONA MEDIA MARKET USING HILL INDEX
Media Weights Ownership Shares HI Analysis
% of % of Parent Company # of % Share Weighted Square Root
Media Medium Outlets Medium Share of Weighted
Share
Clear Channel 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Television Broadcast Communications
33.8% 100% Cornerstone TV, Inc. 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Cox Broadcasting 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Peak Media LLC 2 33.33 11.267 3.357
Penn State University 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Allegheny Mountain 3 21.43 5.336 2.310
Radio Network
24.9% Altoona Trans Audio 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Corp Inc
B&F Enterprises 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Forever Broadcasting 4 28.57 7.114 2.667
Martinsburg 2 14.29 3.557 1.886
Broadcasting
Incorporated
Sounds Good 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Incorporated
Vital Licenses 2 14.29 3.557 1.886
Newspaper Daily Altoona Mirror 1 100 20.246 4.500
28.8% 70.3%
Weekly Weekly (no name in 1 100 8.554 2.925
29.7% data)
Internet Cable Cable (no name in 1 100 2.288 1.512
12.5% 18.3% data)
Other Dial-up, DSL, and 1 100 10.213 3.196
81.7% other (no names in
data)
Hill Index (sum of square roots of weighted ownership shares) 37.733
Source: The first four columns are taken from the FCC's chart for
Altoona. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. The fifth column is calculated by
dividing the number of outlets for the parent company in the fourth column
by the total number of outlets in that media type. These figures are identical
to those found in the FCC's chart, except that they are taken to an
additional significant digit. The sixth column multiplies the media weights
in the first two columns with the share in the fifth column. These figures,
too, are identical to those found in the FCC's chart, except they are taken to
two additional significant digits. Finally, the last column is the square root
of the sixth column.
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